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Brie Gertler 
You feel a tickle in your toe, you taste a tangy lemon drop, you smell coffee brewing. 
These experiences have a distinctive feel, a qualitative character that constitutes what it’s like to 
feel a tickle or taste lemon or smell coffee. Dualism about consciousness says that this 
qualitative character is something over and above the physical processes associated with such 
experiences.  
Historically, dualism was motivated by theological concerns, such as the need to explain 
how the soul could persist into an afterlife. But most contemporary philosophical arguments for 
dualism are entirely naturalistic. And they do not aim to establish the existence of immaterial 
substances such as souls; rather, they aim to show that the qualitative properties of conscious 
experience are non-physical. This chapter will deal exclusively with naturalistic property dualism.  
Dualism is a metaphysical view about the nature of consciousness. But it is driven largely 
by epistemic concerns. Dualism’s chief rival, physicalism about consciousness, is also a 
metaphysical view that is driven largely by epistemic concerns. 
A primary goal of this chapter is to correct a widespread misunderstanding about how 
epistemic issues shape the debate between dualists and physicalists. According to a familiar 
picture, dualism is motivated by armchair reflection, and dualists accord special significance to 
our ways of conceptualizing consciousness and the physical. In contrast, physicalists favor 
empirical data over armchair reflection, and physicalism is a relatively straightforward extension 
of scientific theorizing. This familiar picture is inaccurate. Both dualist and physicalist arguments 
employ a combination of empirical data and armchair reflection; both rely on considerations 
stemming from how we conceptualize certain phenomena; and both aim to establish views that 
are compatible with scientific results but go well beyond the deliverances of empirical science. 
My discussion highlights these neglected epistemic parallels between dualism and physicalism.  
I begin this chapter by fleshing out the distinctive commitments of dualism, in a way that 
illuminates the interplay of epistemic and metaphysical elements within the dualist position. 
Section 2 outlines two influential arguments for dualism and explains how dualists defend those 
arguments from key criticisms. The next two sections examine the most powerful objections to 
dualism. Section 3 discusses the charge that dualism is inferior to physicalism as regards the 
theoretical virtue of simplicity, and hence dualist arguments bear a special burden of proof. 
Section 4 discusses the worry that, given reasonable assumptions, dualists must deny that our 
conscious thoughts and feelings genuinely cause our decisions and actions. I show that each of 
these objections to dualism depends on substantial assumptions that cannot be empirically 
justified. And the objection from mental causation rests on an ambitious assumption about how 
we conceptualize physical phenomena. Section 5 briefly reviews how epistemic considerations 
inform arguments on both sides of this debate.  
                                               
* I’m grateful to Uriah Kriegel and Torin Alter, who offered extremely useful comments on a previous draft 
of this chapter. 
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1. What is Dualism? 
1.1  Dualism vs. physicalism 
Dualism is the thesis that consciousness is not physical—although it may arise from 
physical processes, it is something over and above the physical. As mentioned earlier, 
contemporary naturalistic dualists favor property dualism. Property dualism concerns the 
qualitative character or feel of conscious experiences. It says that these qualitative properties of 
experience do not consist in, and are not necessitated by, physical properties and phenomena.  
Dualism contrasts with physicalism, the thesis that everything, including consciousness, 
is physical (or necessitated by the physical). It is sometimes assumed that physicalism must be 
part of any scientific worldview. Naturalistic dualism challenges that assumption. 
The dualism at issue is naturalistic in both an ontological and a methodological sense. 
Ontologically, naturalistic dualism regards consciousness as an aspect of the natural world. It 
presumably resulted from evolutionary processes, and its relation to the physical is amenable to 
explanation by laws of nature. Methodologically, naturalistic dualism embraces the idea that the 
proper way to investigate consciousness is by the use of broadly scientific methods: the 
acquisition, analysis, and systematization of empirical data.  
 Given naturalistic dualism’s commitment to a scientific outlook, it can be difficult to see 
how, precisely, this view differs from physicalism. There is now a substantial literature on the 
question how best to formulate dualism and physicalism, and on “the” (defining) point at issue 
between these positions. The formulation of dualism I will propose seems to me promising, in 
that it captures the spirit of the debate and is faithful to at least the dominant positions on this 
topic. But contributing to the debate about the proper formulation of dualism is not my purpose 
here. So I do not claim that my construal is preferable to all others. And I admit that there may 
be some views legitimately regarded as physicalist that are compatible with the dualist thesis as I 
construe it; there may even be some versions of dualism that reject that thesis.   
I think a useful way to approach the debate between dualism and physicalism is to 
consider how these competing positions view the prospects for physical science. Dualists can be 
just as optimistic as physicalists about the prospects for empirical science generally. In particular, 
dualists can allow that all of concrete reality, including consciousness, is amenable to explanation 
by empirical science. (I include the qualification “concrete” because the status of abstract objects 
is orthogonal to this debate.) But dualists will deny that an account of consciousness will be part 
of a specifically physical scientific theory. 
Here is an initial, relatively abstract formulation of dualism that reflects this approach. 
Dualism (initial formulation).  A true and exhaustive account of 
consciousness is beyond the reach of physical science. 
This initial formulation of dualism draws on the idea that the notion of the physical 
operative in these debates is tied to physical science. This idea is, I think, very plausible; it 
reflects the inclination of philosophers to defer to scientists as to the particular characteristics of 
ordinary physical objects and phenomena. 
And a link with physical science is present in both of the basic conceptions of the 
physical that Stoljar (2001) identifies. On the theory-based conception, a property is physical if and 
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only if it is, or is necessitated by, “the sort of property that physical theory tells us about” (ibid.: 
256). On the object-based conception, a property is physical if and only if it is, or is necessitated by, 
“the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic 
physical objects and their constituents” (ibid.: 257).1 Neither of these conceptions identifies a 
specific property (such as having spatial extension) as a marker of the physical; they both defer 
to physical science as to the detailed nature of the properties in its domain. In this way, both of 
these conceptions tie the notion of the physical to the domain of physical science: what physical 
science investigates, or what it (ideally) discovers. 
Dualism is a metaphysical thesis. So my initial formulation is apt only if the standard 
defining “the reach of physical science” is metaphysical: that is, only if the domain of physical 
science is delineated by the metaphysical features of the items it explains or posits. I will propose 
a metaphysical standard in 1.3 below.  
However, epistemic standards for physical science also figure prominently in this debate. 
Epistemic standards construe physical science in terms of certain methods of investigation. 
Because dualism is a metaphysical position, it is not committed to the epistemic thesis that the 
methods of physical science are inadequate for understanding consciousness. However, that 
thesis plays a leading role in some arguments for dualism. So I will discuss it before turning to a 
fuller explication of dualism.  
1.2  An epistemic standard for physical science: objectivity 
Physical science is often described as objective, by virtue of its methods of data collection 
and analysis. Following Goldman (1997), we can characterize objective methods as those that 
could (in principle) be used by different researchers investigating a single phenomenon—and, if 
so used, would generate the same results.2 Prohibiting the use of non-objective methods may 
seem prudent, as it bars scientists from relying on epistemically dubious sources such as mystical 
visions.  
But a restriction to objective methods also excludes introspection. Since introspection 
can be used only by a single subject—the person undergoing the introspected experience—it is 
an exclusively first-personal, non-objective method.3  
At present, some areas of physical science, including psychology and neuroscience, make 
essential use of introspective reports from experimental subjects. And medical trials standardly 
rely on subjects’ reports, e.g. about the kind and degree of pain they’re feeling. Dualists contend 
that this reliance on introspection is unavoidable, since one must reflect on one’s own 
experience to appreciate the qualitative features of conscious experiences—e.g., what it’s like to 
feel a tickle or smell coffee. Any means of recognizing what someone else is feeling ultimately 
depends on introspection, to correlate the third-personal data with the experience in question. 
For example, knowing that certain kinds of neuronal activity are correlated with tickles might 
enable a scientist to determine, through fMRI, that a particular subject is feeling a tickle. But 
introspective reports are required to establish the initial correlation between the neuronal activity 
and those experiences. And tracking neuronal activity wouldn’t enable the scientist to 
comprehend what the subject was feeling, according to the dualist, unless the scientist knew 
from her own experience what it’s like to feel a tickle. Since no purely third-personal knowledge 
will suffice for understanding what it’s like to feel a tickle, no purely objective methodology will 
suffice for recognizing a tickle as such. 
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Dualists maintain that this situation is inescapable. Although developments in 
neuroscience may enable us to identify conscious experiences in others through fMRI or more 
advanced techniques, first-personal observations are required both for establishing the initial 
correlations to such third-personal data and for comprehending the qualitative features that 
make conscious experiences what they are. Jaynes expresses this point forcefully, using 
knowledge of the brain to represent what is available through third-personal methods:  
Though we knew the connections of every tickling thread of every single axon 
and dendrite in every species that ever existed, together with all its 
neurotransmitters and how they varied in its billions of synapses of every brain 
that ever existed, we could still never - not ever - from a knowledge of the brain 
alone know if that brain contained a consciousness like our own. (Jaynes 
1976/2000: 18)    
By contrast, most physicalists maintain that we could eventually overcome this reliance 
on introspection. They claim that every genuine property associated with conscious experience 
could, in principle, be detected without reliance on introspection. Physicalists generally allow 
that some ways of characterizing or thinking about a given property are available only to the 
experiencing subject. But they generally deny that any genuine properties of conscious experiences 
are accessible in principle only through introspection, or that undergoing an experience provides 
for substantial knowledge about the experience that is not available through other means.4  
Now if a comprehensive understanding of tickles or other conscious experiences 
required having had those experiences—or even required having had conscious experiences at 
all—then conscious experience would differ sharply from other phenomena. After all, one 
needn’t undergo photosynthesis or engage in asexual reproduction or experience planetary 
motion in order to fully comprehend those phenomena. To deny that conscious experience is in 
principle accessible via third-personal methods is, in effect, to posit a disparity between 
conscious experience and other phenomena. On this view, conscious experience differs from 
other phenomena in that one must have had conscious experiences in order to fully understand 
them. 
This methodological issue exposes a fault line in this debate, concerning whether a true 
and exhaustive account of consciousness requires the use of first-personal methods. Most 
physicalists reject this idea. Dualists accept it. The corresponding claim is as follows. 
The subjectivity of consciousness.  A true and exhaustive account of 
consciousness is beyond the reach of a purely objective science. 
This claim interprets the initial dualist thesis in epistemic terms: physical science cannot fully 
account for consciousness because its domain is limited to what is accessible via objective 
methods.  
As an epistemic thesis, the subjectivity of consciousness does not entail, and is not 
entailed by, the metaphysical thesis of dualism. Still, this epistemic thesis contributes to some 
arguments for dualism, and it is difficult to reconcile with physicalism. Physicalists can deny the 
subjectivity of consciousness. Or they can argue that the presence of an epistemic divide 
between the physical (which is accessible through objective methods) and consciousness (which 
is not), does not imply that there is a metaphysical divide between them. Each of these strategies 
faces difficulties.5 
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1.3  A metaphysical standard for physical science: structure and dynamics 
On my formulation, the dualist thesis is that an exhaustive account of consciousness is 
beyond the reach of physical science. The subjectivity of consciousness is an epistemic gloss of 
this thesis: it construes it in methodological terms. But to express dualism we need a 
metaphysical standard, one that construes physical science in terms of the kinds of things 
(objects, properties, and phenomena) it recognizes.  
The metaphysical standard I have in mind derives from what is arguably the prevailing 
conception of physical science. On this conception, phenomena at higher “levels”, such as 
biological or astronomical phenomena, are explained by identifying phenomena at lower 
“levels”, such as the phenomena studied in chemistry or physics, that constitute or necessitate 
them. This conception is driven by the idea that all physical phenomena are ultimately 
constituted (or necessitated) by fundamental phenomena, falling within the domain of physics. 
This means that phenomena at higher levels cannot vary independently of fundamental 
phenomena. To put it metaphorically: once God set in place everything that falls within the 
domain of physics—all of the most basic entities, with their particular properties and at their 
particular locations, and all of the laws governing their behavior—nothing more was needed to 
bring it about that photosynthesis and asexual reproduction occurred, or to set the patterns of 
planetary motion.  
There is no consensus as to what types of entities and phenomena ultimately constitute, 
and explain, all physical phenomena. The fundamental level may include fermions, bosons, and 
other “elementary” particles, with properties of mass, charge, and spin. Or, if string theory is 
correct, such particles may be ultimately constituted by strings whose vibrations play the roles 
we assign to mass, charge, and spin. Alternatively, the fundamental level may be composed of 
things as yet unimagined. What is important is the form that physical science explanations take. 
Physical theory explains higher-level phenomena, such as biological and astronomical 
phenomena, by reference to lower-level phenomena, such as those studied in chemistry and 
physics, that constitute or necessitate the higher-level phenomena. 
Crucially, higher-level phenomena are explained by reference to the structure and dynamics 
of underlying entities. (Throughout this chapter, my discussion of structure and dynamics is 
deeply indebted to Chalmers 2002.) To get a sense of structural-dynamical explanations, 
consider a familiar fact: lukewarm water poured into a glass will conform to the shape of the 
glass, whereas an ice cube placed into a glass will retain its shape. Chemists explain these 
differing reactions by citing the structural and dynamical properties of H2O molecules. The 
relevant structural features include the composition of those molecules (two hydrogen atoms 
and one oxygen atom) and their polarity (the uneven distribution of negative and positive 
charges within them). The relevant dynamical factors include the way intermolecular forces bind 
molecules with that polarity, and how temperature affects these bonds. Together, these 
structural and dynamical characteristics (combined with the structural-dynamic features of the 
molecular constituents of glass, etc.) explain why the bonds between H2O molecules are tighter 
at lower temperatures and, hence, why ice cubes retain their shape whereas lukewarm water 
conforms to its container.  
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Alter provides this helpful summary:  
[S]tructural-dynamic descriptions are those that are analyzable in formal, 
spatiotemporal, and nomic terms, where the formal is the logical and the 
mathematical, and the nomic is the domain of laws and causation. (Alter 
2016: 795) 
Note that in the explanation just given, facts about structure and dynamics are taken to 
necessitate the target phenomena. To return to our earlier metaphor: once God fixed the structural 
and dynamic facts, nothing more needed to be done to fix the facts about how H2O at various 
temperatures reacts to being placed in a container. Those latter facts are necessitated by the 
structural-dynamic facts. 
On the prevailing conception of physical science, physical science explains (higher-level) 
phenomena by giving structural-dynamic descriptions of (lower-level) phenomena that 
constitute or necessitate them. Moreover, physical science is restricted to explanations of this 
sort: the lower-level factors that explain the target phenomena are characterized purely in terms 
of structure and dynamics. This conception of physical science, applied to my initial, abstract 
formulation of dualism, yields a more specific thesis: 
A true and exhaustive account of consciousness is beyond the reach of a 
science that explains its targets purely in terms of structure and dynamics. 
Let’s use the term “structural-dynamic phenomena” to refer to phenomena for which 
structural-dynamic descriptions are exhaustive: that is, they capture every aspect of these 
phenomena. On the conception of physical science just described, explanations identify 
structural-dynamic phenomena that constitute or necessitate the target phenomena. Combining 
these points to the thesis just given yields the following dualist thesis.  
Dualism.  Conscious experience is neither constituted nor necessitated by 
structural-dynamic phenomena. 
This will be our working formulation of dualism. It takes conscious experience to be 
non-physical by virtue of its defining qualitative properties—those responsible for what it’s like to 
feel a tickle or taste lemon (etc.). (Arguably, conscious experience just is the instantiation of 
those properties in a subject at a time.) As I mentioned earlier, I am not claiming that this is the 
only reasonable way to formulate dualism. But I believe that it captures the spirit of prominent 
dualist views, and of the larger debate more generally.   
The dualist thesis says that conscious experience cannot be analyzed purely in terms of 
structure and dynamics, and is not constituted or necessitated by anything amenable to 
structural-dynamic analysis. Of course, the dualist can allow that consciousness has structural 
and dynamic features. Gazing at a blue mug full of steaming coffee, the internal structure of 
your visual experience may include shifting wispy trails of white above a static blue patch. 
Similarly, consciousness may be dynamically related to other phenomena: pains may arise from 
certain types of neuronal activity, and may cause us to say “ouch!”. But these structural and 
dynamic features do not constitute or necessitate what it’s like to have that visual experience or to 
feel pain, according to dualism. The dualist contends that conscious experience’s intrinsic 
qualitative character is not amenable to structural-dynamic analysis. 
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More generally, dualists maintain that any attempt to describe conscious experience in 
purely structural-dynamic terms will leave out a crucial—really, the crucial—feature of conscious 
experience, namely, its qualitative character. Suppose that we had an exhaustive structural-
dynamic description of a certain kind of neuronal activity. Suppose further (and less plausibly) 
that this kind of neuronal activity was perfectly correlated with pain. According to the dualist, 
the structural and dynamic features of this neuronal activity would not explain the occurrence of 
a conscious experience with the qualitative character of pain. In Levine’s terms, there remains an 
“explanatory gap” between these structural-dynamic phenomena and consciousness: we can still 
wonder about why pain arises when, and only when, that neuronal activity occurs (Levine 1983). 
This contrasts with the water example. When we understand the structural and dynamic features 
of H2O molecules (and the structural-dynamic features of the molecular constituents of glass, 
etc.), we no longer wonder why lukewarm water conforms to the shape of the glass.   
Dualists draw support for their view from this contrast. The behavior of H2O is fully 
explained by underlying structure and dynamics, precisely because we can see how fixing the 
structural-dynamic facts fixes the facts about how H2O behaves. In other words, the structural-
dynamic facts necessitate the facts about how H2O behaves. But we cannot see how fixing the 
structural and dynamic characteristics of lower-level phenomena—whether these are 
neurophysiological or involve fundamental entities treated by physics—fixes the facts about 
conscious experience. According to the dualist, this suggests that structural-dynamic facts do not 
necessitate the facts about conscious experience, and hence that consciousness is not physical. 
Dualists deny that physical facts necessitate the facts about consciousness: that is, they 
maintain that consciousness could vary independently of structure and dynamics. But naturalistic 
dualists generally allow that, because of contingent laws of nature linking consciousness to 
structure and dynamics, consciousness will not actually vary independently of structural-dynamic 
phenomena. Dualism is compatible with the idea that conscious experience arises from 
structural-dynamic phenomena in a lawlike way.  
An analogy will illustrate why, compatibly with dualism, conscious experience may arise 
from structural-dynamic phenomena in a lawlike way. Suppose that there exist non-physical 
ghostly spirits, whose presence and behavior is not constituted or necessitated by structural-
dynamic phenomena. Suppose further that these spirits can be conjured by conducting a séance: 
lighting candles while reciting certain incantations, say. We can stipulate that these physical 
activities give rise, in a lawlike way, to the spirits’ presence. This latter stipulation is compatible 
with the spirits being non-physical. If the spirits are non-physical—if they have features not 
amenable to structural-dynamic explanation—then the laws relating physical phenomena to the 
spirit world are not those (the “dynamics”) governing interactions among physical entities. In 
this sense, they are not physical (structural-dynamic) laws. 
Astronomical, biological, and chemical phenomena are necessitated by structural-
dynamic phenomena at lower levels. But conscious experience is not so necessitated, according 
to the dualist. This brings out the sense in which dualism is dualist. Physical phenomena—
phenomena within the domain of physical science—are structural-dynamic phenomena (or at 
least necessitated by structural-dynamic phenomena). But according to dualism, consciousness is 
neither a structural-dynamic phenomenon nor necessitated by structural-dynamic phenomena. 
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1.4  The epistemic, the metaphysical, and brute necessities 
The subjectivity of consciousness thesis (section 1.2) is epistemic: it concerns what is 
required for recognizing conscious experience and grasping its qualitative features. Dualism is a 
metaphysical thesis: it concerns the nature of consciousness. Still, it might seem that the 
subjectivity of consciousness implies the truth of dualism. For suppose that dualism was false, 
and tickle experiences could be exhaustively characterized in terms of structure and dynamics 
(presumably the structural-dynamic features of neuronal activity or phenomena underlying such 
activity). In that case, we might expect objective methods to be adequate for understanding and 
identifying structural-dynamic phenomena. A well-informed investigator could completely 
understand tickles by grasping those structural-dynamic facts, and could recognize a tickle by 
recognizing the corresponding structural-dynamic phenomena. So if tickles were simply a matter 
of structure and dynamics, we would not need to rely on introspection to recognize tickles or to 
understand how they feel.  
This is why dualism seems to follow from the subjectivity of consciousness. If dualism 
were false, and the qualitative features of conscious experiences were a matter of structure and 
dynamics, then we should expect that those features would be accessible through objective 
methods. So if the feel of a tickle is not objectively accessible, this suggests that dualism is true. 
However, the subjectivity of consciousness—an epistemic thesis—does not imply the 
metaphysical thesis of dualism. To say that structural-dynamic phenomena necessitate 
consciousness is not to say that we can make sense of how or why they do so. The necessitation 
may instead be brute, in that there remains an epistemic divide (or “explanatory gap”) between 
structural-dynamic phenomena and consciousness. So long as conscious experiences are 
necessitated by structural-dynamic phenomena, dualism is false. Yet consciousness might 
nonetheless be subjective. It might be that first-personal methods are required for detecting and 
comprehending conscious experience, even if conscious experience is somehow necessitated, in 
a way that we can’t comprehend—that is, brutely—by structural-dynamic phenomena within the 
reach of objective methods.  
If the necessary link between structural-dynamic phenomena and tickles were 
unintelligible to us, then even a well-informed investigator couldn’t detect a tickle by relying 
solely on structural-dynamical evidence. For the investigator couldn’t “read off” the qualitative 
features from the structural-dynamical information. On the reasonable presumption that 
objective methods provide only information about structure and dynamics, the investigator 
would need to use first-person methods to detect tickles and correlate them with structural-
dynamic phenomena such as neuronal activity. 
It bears repeating that this situation, in which the structure and dynamics of lower-level 
phenomena somehow necessitate conscious experiences but this necessitation is opaque to us, 
differs starkly from paradigm cases of structural-dynamic explanation. Once we know the 
relevant structural and dynamical facts about H2O molecules (and about the molecular 
constituents of glass, etc.), we fully understand why ice cubes retain their shape when placed in 
glass containers. The dualist will contend that this disparity is systematic, in that brute necessities 
are not required for structural-dynamic explanations of phenomena other than consciousness. 
For the dualist, this is reason for skepticism about brute necessities. 
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This juxtaposition of the epistemic and the metaphysical informs the dialectical structure 
of the debate over dualism. Dualists generally believe that consciousness is subjective, and take 
the epistemic disparity between consciousness (as subjective) and the physical (as objective) to 
point to a metaphysical disparity, and thereby to dualism. The step from the epistemic to the 
metaphysical is supported by the assumption that there are no brute necessities. For their part, 
some physicalists deny that there is an unbridgeable epistemic gap between consciousness and 
the physical. This position is known as a priori physicalism (see Ch. 17 of this volume). Other 
physicalists allow that there is such a gap, but deny that this epistemic gap provides reason to 
think that consciousness differs in kind from the physical. This latter position embraces brute 
necessities, and is known as a posteriori physicalism (see Ch. 18 of this volume). 
2.  Arguments for dualism 
There are three leading arguments for dualism: the Knowledge Argument (Jackson 
1982), the Zombie Argument (Chalmers 1996), and the Modal Argument (Kripke 1980). In each 
of these, epistemic premises play a crucial role in securing the metaphysical thesis of dualism. In 
fact, these three arguments are all variations on the theme just mentioned: there is an epistemic 
gap between consciousness and physical phenomena, and hence these are ontologically distinct. 
I will focus on the Knowledge and Zombie Arguments, which are especially accessible and 
illuminating. 
2.1  The Knowledge Argument 
Although others had presented similar arguments, the most famous formulation of the 
Knowledge Argument is Jackson’s (1982). Jackson describes Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist of 
the future, who has spent her entire life in a room that is exclusively black, white, and shades of 
gray. While in the room, Mary comes to know all of the physical facts about color vision. She 
knows how the surface properties of objects affect light reflectance, and she knows how the 
human visual system processes light at various wavelengths. For example, she knows that “red” 
is the term for the qualitative property that normal humans experience when their retinas are 
struck by light with a wavelength of 620-780 nanometers. We can even suppose that she has 
identified perfect correlations between types of color experiences and types of neuronal activity. 
But she has never seen any colors.  
Jackson invites us to consider what will happen when Mary leaves the room and, for the 
first time, sees something red (and which she knows to be red), such as a stop sign. He thinks 
that Mary will learn something new about color experience. She might express this new 
knowledge by saying, “Oh, this is what it’s like to see red!” Jackson argues that, since Mary 
already knew all of the physical facts about color experience, this fact about the qualitative 
character of “seeing red” experiences is not a physical fact. He concludes that physicalism is 
false, and so dualism is true.  
The subjectivity of consciousness is pivotal to this argument. Mary had access to all of 
the objective facts about color experience before her release: the only thing she lacked was first-
person access to color experience, since she had not had experienced color herself. So if she 
learns what it’s like to see red only when she first sees something red, this means that objective 
methods will not reveal the qualitative character of color experience. This implies that objective 
methods will not yield a full understanding of consciousness; that is, consciousness is subjective. 
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Jackson thus derives metaphysical dualism from the epistemic divide between what can be 
known via objective methods and what requires first-person experience.  
Jackson does not define “physical”, but cashing out the notion of the physical in terms 
of structure and dynamics preserves the spirit and force of his argument. While in the room, 
Mary learns all of the structural-dynamic facts about color experience; we may further suppose 
that she has a comprehensive structural-dynamic description of the human visual system, the 
behavior of light, etc. But it seems she cannot know what it’s like to see red—following standard 
usage, let’s call such facts phenomenal facts—except by seeing something red. This means that that 
phenomenal fact is not deducible from the facts about structure and dynamics. Now if 
phenomenal facts were necessitated by structural-dynamic facts, then Mary’s full knowledge of 
the structural-dynamic facts should enable her to deduce the phenomenal facts. After all, if Mary 
knew the structural and dynamic facts about H2O molecules, she could deduce that ice cubes 
retain their shapes in containers, even if she’d never encountered an ice cube. To maintain that 
the phenomenal facts are necessitated by the structural-dynamic facts, but are not deducible 
from them, it to embrace the brute necessities mentioned earlier. So unless there are brute 
necessities, the claim that Mary learns what it’s like to see red only when leaving the room 
implies dualism. In this way, the “no brute necessities” assumption licenses the shift from this 
argument’s epistemic premises to its metaphysical conclusion.  
2.2  The Zombie Argument 
The Zombie Argument, developed in its most sophisticated form by Chalmers (1996), 
also aims to show that phenomenal facts are not deducible from physical facts. But instead of 
describing the situation of an isolated neuroscientist, Chalmers uses a more direct thought 
experiment. He asks you to try to conceive of a creature that is identical to you in all physical 
respects, but that lacks consciousness—a “zombie”. Chalmers expects that you will be able to 
conceive of a zombie. That is, he thinks you will detect no incoherence in the idea of a 
molecule-for-molecule duplicate of yourself, with identical neurophysiology, but which lacks 
conscious experience. For example, he thinks you can conceive of your zombie twin undergoing 
c-fiber stimulation without experiencing the pain that you experience when your c-fibers are 
stimulated.6 That you can conceive of a zombie—that you find nothing incoherent in the idea of 
a creature sharing your physical features, but lacking consciousness—means that you cannot 
deduce, from facts about a creature’s physical constitution, that conscious experience is or is not 
present. As in the Knowledge Argument, this non-deducibility is taken to show that phenomenal 
facts are not necessitated by physical facts. 
Our formulation of dualism is well-suited to this argument. (This is unsurprising, since 
that formulation is taken from Chalmers’ work.) In conceiving of a zombie, one conceives of a 
creature that is identical to oneself in all structural-dynamic respects but lacks conscious 
experiences. This means that facts about conscious experience are not deducible from facts 
about structure and dynamics. After all, you can equally conceive that a creature exactly similar 
to a zombie, in all structural-dynamic respects, does have conscious experiences. For you are such 
a creature. Since you can’t distinguish yourself from your zombie twin purely on the basis of 
structural-dynamic features, you cannot deduce that consciousness is (or is not) present from 
knowledge of those features. As with the Knowledge Argument, the step from this epistemic 
premise to the dualist conclusion relies on the “no brute necessities” assumption. That is, it 
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relies on the assumption that, if the phenomenal facts were necessitated by structural-dynamic 
facts, then we could deduce the former from the latter.  
It’s worth noting that, in contrast with the Knowledge Argument, the Zombie Argument 
need not rely on the subjectivity of consciousness. Each of these arguments attempts to 
establish dualism by pointing to an epistemic divide between consciousness and the physical. 
But in the Zombie Argument, this divide need not be specifically a divide between the subjective 
and the objective. Consider the point made in the previous paragraph: you can’t distinguish 
yourself from your zombie twin purely on the basis of structural-dynamic features. So facts about 
consciousness are not deducible from those features. Now it may well be that the best diagnosis 
of this non-deducibility is that consciousness is subjective whereas the physical is objective. But 
the Zombie Argument does not strictly require that the epistemic divide is a divide between the 
subjective and the objective. 
We believe that other human beings have conscious experiences. And arguably, we infer 
that they are conscious from their physical features and behavior: after all, we don’t have 
anything else to go on. (Particularly salient here is the capacity for articulate speech, which 
zombies also exhibit.) However, the inference from others’ physical similarity to the conclusion 
that they are conscious is not deductive. You can imagine, in a twist on a classic horror film 
trope, that the human-like creatures around you are zombies, with no conscious inner life. (This 
scenario is at odds with most versions of naturalistic dualism, which take consciousness to arise 
from the physical contingently but in a way governed by laws of nature; see note 6.) That others 
are physically similar to you is strong but not absolutely conclusive evidence that they have 
conscious experiences roughly similar to your own.  
2.3  Can we really perform these thought experiments? 
 Some physicalists charge that these thought experiments are unreliable, as we are not 
equipped to competently evaluate the scenarios at issue. As applied to the Knowledge 
Argument, the worry is that even a well-informed scientist doesn’t have the information needed 
to meaningfully imagine knowing all of the physical (structural-dynamic) facts about color 
experience. So we are not in a position to determine whether such knowledge would enable us 
to deduce the phenomenal facts. As applied to the Zombie Argument, the worry is that even a 
well-informed scientist doesn’t have the information needed to truly conceive of a perfect 
physical (structural-dynamic) duplicate, and hence we cannot evaluate whether the possibility of 
a zombie is coherent. 
It’s true that neuroscience is still in its early days, and theories in fundamental physics 
remain speculative. In engaging in these thought experiments we must therefore rely on a 
general conception of what it is to be physical. Following Chalmers (2002), I have suggested that 
we conceive of the physical as what can be exhaustively characterized in terms of structure and 
dynamics. But this suggestion does not silence the current worry. For we don’t know what kinds 
of structural-dynamic phenomena are yet to be discovered, or how our models of physical 
phenomena might evolve (while remaining structural-dynamic). So we cannot conceive of all of 
Mary’s knowledge, or all of the properties that would be shared by our structural-dynamic 
duplicate, in detail.7  
The dualist will maintain that the details aren’t needed to perform the thought 
experiment, as careful reflection on what it’s like to feel a tickle or smell coffee enables us to 
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recognize that such qualitative features of experience are not amenable to any structural-dynamic 
explanation, regardless of the specific structural-dynamic details. This response highlights the 
significance of conceptual matters in this debate. The dualist arguments rely on the accuracy of 
our phenomenal concepts, developed through introspective reflection on experience, and also 
draw on our physical concepts. As we will see below, conceptual matters are also central to 
physicalist objections to dualism. These objections are grounded in confidence about our ways 
of conceptualizing the physical, as expressed in our physical theories. They presume that our 
conceptualizations are not only useful but represent physical reality accurately and 
comprehensively.  
Perhaps most importantly, our ignorance about the neuroscience of consciousness and 
the nature of fundamental physics cuts both ways. For the greater our ignorance about these 
matters, the less confident we should be about what form a comprehensive theory of concrete 
phenomena will take. In particular, recognizing that advances in fundamental physics may alter 
our current models of physical phenomena should limit our confidence that all of concrete 
reality is amenable to explanation in structural-dynamic terms—or perhaps even in any terms 
that qualify the successful theory as a physical theory, in a non-trivial sense. 
2.4  The use of armchair reasoning 
The Knowledge and Zombie arguments rest on the use of introspection and a priori 
reflection. This exposes them to doubts about whether such “armchair reasoning” is legitimate 
as a means of discerning metaphysical truths about concrete reality. 
The worry is that armchair reasoning seems to reveal only epistemic facts. We may 
discover, through introspective reflection on the feel of a tickle, that phenomenal properties 
appear not to be a matter of structure and dynamics. Armchair reasoning may also reveal that we 
cannot deduce phenomenal facts from physical facts, and that we can conceive of zombies. But 
these are merely epistemic matters, insufficient to establish dualism.  
The relation between the epistemic and the metaphysical is a philosophically 
foundational one. Positions on this issue are grounded in complex accounts of thought, 
reference, and modality. Fortunately, we needn’t go into the details of those accounts to 
determine whether, in the context of this debate, it is legitimate for the dualist to use armchair 
reasoning. This is because the case for physicalism equally rests on armchair reasoning. Let me 
explain. 
According to physicalism, facts about structure and dynamics necessitate all facts (about 
concrete reality—I will omit this in what follows). That is, it is impossible for any facts, 
including facts about conscious experience, to vary independently of facts about structure and 
dynamics. Now in order to establish that something is necessary or impossible, armchair 
reasoning is indispensable. Ordinary observation can establish that something is possible: if you 
see a cat on the mat, you can safely conclude that it is possible for cats to be on mats. But claims 
about what is necessary or what is impossible cannot be established through observation.  
For example, the discovery that every creature undergoing a certain kind of neuronal 
activity is also experiencing pain would not show that these were linked with metaphysical 
necessity. This might be simply a coincidence. More plausibly, they may be linked nomologically: 
laws of nature may ensure that pain arises from neuronal activity of that kind. And if the link 
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between consciousness and the physical is only a matter of contingent laws of nature, then 
dualism is true (as our séance example illustrated). So nothing that could be established simply 
through empirical observation—not even perfect correlations between types of neuronal activity 
and types of conscious states—could resolve this debate in favor of physicalism.8 The case for 
physicalism requires going beyond empirical observations (which concern what’s actual) and 
generalizations from those observations. The dualist can allow that, because of contingent but 
lawlike regularities, conscious experience will not vary independently of the underlying physical 
phenomena. But the physicalist thesis requires more than this. It requires that conscious 
experience could not vary independently of the physical. 
As the next two sections will illustrate, the case for thinking that consciousness is 
necessitated by the physical relies on armchair reasoning. Specifically, it relies on significant 
assumptions about the nature of the physical, assumptions that cannot be verified by empirical 
science or reasonably inferred from its findings.  
3. Dualism and Theoretical Simplicity 
We now turn to the first influential challenge to dualism. This challenge stems from the 
idea that, given the success of physical science generally, a physicalist theory of consciousness 
will provide for a theory of concrete phenomena that is simpler than dualism, and hence 
possesses greater explanatory power.  
The physical sciences are rightly regarded as exemplars of knowledge production, given 
their remarkable success in explaining and predicting a wide range of phenomena. So it is natural 
to hope that they will someday provide a comprehensive account of all concrete phenomena, 
including consciousness.  
If that hope were realized, the resulting theory would have the virtue of simplicity. 
Suppose that all phenomena, including consciousness, were amenable to explanation in terms of 
structure and dynamics. In that case, a single explanatory framework could be adequate for 
explaining all phenomena. The resulting physical theory might well be simpler than dualism in 
two ways. First, it might include fewer basic kinds of things in its ontology, since all of the basic 
entities it recognizes will be amenable to structural-dynamic analysis. (This dimension of 
simplicity is known as parsimony.) Second, it might include fewer fundamental laws, since it need 
not include special fundamental laws linking structural-dynamic phenomena to consciousness. 
(This is known as elegance.) 9   
Simplicity concerns exert a powerful, often covert influence on the dualism-physicalism 
debate. I suspect that it is the appeal of greater simplicity that is responsible for the sense that 
dualism faces a greater initial burden of proof.  
Whether simplicity considerations provide good reason to favor physicalism depends on 
how the arguments for dualism fare. In general, simplicity concerns guide theory choice only 
when the theories being compared accommodate the data equally well. And the arguments for 
dualism attempt to show that physicalist theories don’t accommodate all of the data about 
conscious experience. The thought experiments in the Knowledge Argument and the Zombie 
Argument are designed to lead us to conclude that our own introspective data—data we glean 
from introspecting our own experiences—are not accommodated by a physicalist theory. In our 
 14 
formulation, these data are not accommodated by a theory that explains phenomena purely in 
terms of structure and dynamics.  
In response, the physicalist can argue that we should be wary of the claim that these data 
cannot be explained by a physicalist theory, precisely because respecting that claim requires 
sacrificing simplicity. After all, the physicalist might say, the importance of simplicity raises the 
bar for arguments aiming to establish dualism. And this high bar cannot be cleared simply by 
observing that some data about experiences appear to resist structural-dynamic explanation. 
To assess this issue, we need to understand the importance of simplicity. How much 
does simplicity matter, in evaluating a theory? And why does it matter? These questions are 
surprisingly difficult to answer. While simpler theories are generally preferred in the sciences, the 
preference for simplicity does not translate easily to philosophy. The scientific preference may 
be driven by instrumental or even aesthetic considerations, whereas the philosopher’s exclusive 
concern is with truth. And there is no clear reason to think that a simpler theory is more likely to 
be true.  
A natural thought is that “simpler theories are more likely to be true” might be 
established inductively. An inductive argument could cite the fact that simplicity considerations 
guide theory choice in the sciences, and so take the predictive success of the sciences as a basis 
for inferring that greater simplicity indicates a greater likelihood of truth. But as Huemer (2009) 
demonstrates, this strategy is problematically circular. We regard scientific theories as true 
because the truth of their claims is the simplest explanation of their predictive success. The 
inference from predictive success to truth depends on the assumption that simplicity is linked 
with truth, and so it cannot (non-circularly) establish that link.  
The prospects for an empirical justification for favoring simpler theories, in the search 
for truth, seem dim. Sober argues that, while favoring simpler theories may be justified as a 
means of maximizing predictive success, there may be no way of justifying the assumption that a 
simpler theory is more likely to be true (Sober 2009).10  
The first challenge to dualism is physical science’s record of success, and the 
corresponding promise of a unified physicalist theory encompassing consciousness and other 
phenomena. But whether a unified physicalist theory is possible depends on how the dualist 
arguments fare. Some contributors to this debate take physicalism’s greater simplicity to warrant 
skepticism about data that threaten this unification project—e.g., introspective data that 
supports the Knowledge and Zombie arguments. This strategy invests simplicity with an 
importance and relevance to truth that may be impossible to justify—and seems not to be open 
to empirical justification. So we should be wary of taking the perceived threat to simplicity as 
grounds for skepticism about the data used to support dualism.  
4. Dualism and Mental Causation 
The most influential objection to dualism—and, correspondingly, the most influential 
argument for physicalism—concerns mental causation. The problem of mental causation is 
standardly regarded as the most serious challenge to dualism. This challenge takes many forms. 
My focus will be on the form that has dominated discussion for the past 30 years or so, namely, 
the exclusion argument.  
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4.1  The exclusion argument  
We ordinarily assume that conscious experiences have physical effects. Tickles cause us 
to laugh; pain causes us to seek analgesics. But a powerful argument suggests that, if conscious 
experiences are something over and above the physical, then they do not cause physical events. 
According to this argument, dualism implies that conscious experience is epiphenomenal: it may be 
caused by physical events or processes, but it does not have physical effects. Some dualists 
embrace epiphenomenalism about consciousness, while others argue that conscious experience, 
although non-physical, can causally affect the physical realm. The problem of mental causation is 
widely regarded, by physicalists and dualists alike, as the most serious challenge facing dualism. 
Why think that dualism implies that conscious experience has no physical effects? In a 
nutshell, the worry is this. In order to explain a physical event, we never need to invoke anything 
non-physical—or so it seems. For example, we may one day be able to fully explain how tickles 
cause laughter and how pain causes us to say “ouch!” and to seek analgesics. Such explanations 
would presumably invoke only physical causes: in our terms, only phenomena that are amenable 
to structural-dynamic explanation. (For brevity, I will continue to use “physical”.) Given the 
availability of purely physical explanations of human behavior, no explanatory work remains for 
non-physical factors to perform. So if the qualitative character of tickles and pains—how these 
sensations feel—is non-physical, then reference to this qualitative character is not needed to 
explain laughter or analgesic-seeking behavior. More generally: if, for every physical event that 
can be causally explained, a causal explanation in purely physical terms is available (in principle), 
then the non-physical seems inconsequential, as regards causal explanations of physical 
phenomena. 
This problem, which is known as the exclusion problem, was developed in its contemporary 
form by Jaegwon Kim (1989a). The availability of purely physical explanations seems to leave no 
work to be done by explanations citing non-physical factors, and hence to exclude the latter. 
Now even if non-physical features of conscious experiences are not needed for causally 
explaining physical events, this does not mean that those features are causally inert. Imagine that 
you’re awoken by two simultaneous alarms. Each of these alarms is redundant, in that the 
presence of the other alarm means that neither one is needed for the task of awakening you. But 
adding the second alarm didn’t silence the first one; neither alarm is robbed of its causal power by 
the presence of the other. Similarly, a causal explanation of laughter may invoke the (non-
physical) feel of a tickle even if, given the availability of a physical explanation, the explanation 
that invokes that non-physical feel is redundant. 
Suppose that, for every physical event for which a causal explanation is available, there is 
an explanation in purely physical terms. Non-physical properties of experience might 
nonetheless be invoked in (admittedly redundant) causal explanations of physical events. In that 
case, every physical effect (such as saying “ouch!”) of a non-physical conscious experience (such 
as feeling a pain) is overdetermined: there is a physical cause, capable of bringing about the effect all 
on its own (perhaps neuronal activity), and an additional non-physical cause (the pain sensation), 
also capable of bringing about the effect all on its own. The specter of rampant 
overdetermination—a pervasive redundancy in nature—is unappealing.  
The dualist has three unattractive options. The first is to deny that conscious experiences 
have causal efficacy—that is, to embrace epiphenomenalism. The second is to maintain that 
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conscious experiences are causally efficacious, by allowing the type of rampant 
overdetermination just described. The third option is to deny that every physical effect could be 
explained purely by reference to physical phenomena.  
The physicalist can avoid this problem by saying that conscious experiences just are 
physical events (so qualitative character is a physical feature).11 In that case, conscious 
experiences and physical events don’t compete for the title “cause”, since they are one and the 
same. So physical explanations don’t exclude explanations that cite conscious experiences. 
Papineau (2002) provides a tidy formulation of this argument.12  
(1)  Some conscious experiences have physical effects. (This is the rejection of 
epiphenomenalism.) 
(2)  All physical effects are fully caused by purely physical prior histories. (That 
is: for every physical event that can be causally explained, a purely physical 
explanation is in principle available.) 
(3)  The physical effects of conscious experiences aren’t always 
overdetermined by distinct causes. 
Conclusion:  The conscious experiences mentioned in (1) must be identical with 
some part of the physical causes mentioned in (2).  
Suppose we want to identify what caused your laughter. To secure a non-superfluous 
explanatory role for the feel of the tickle, reference to that feeling should be essential to the 
causal explanation. This requirement is easily met by simply identifying that feeling with a type of 
physical state. On this physicalist proposal, “tickle sensation” and “neuronal activity N” refer to 
the same thing—they are two terms for a single type of state. To say that that state caused your 
laughter is to provide a physical explanation (consonant with premise 2) that invokes conscious 
experience (confirming premise 1) but avoids overdetermination (confirming premise 3). 
The physicalist thesis that avoids the exclusion problem, and that serves as the 
conclusion of this argument, is especially strong. The idea that tickle sensations are strictly 
identical to a certain kind of physical event implies that tickle sensations cannot be realized in 
other physical types—other types of brains, with different structural-dynamic characteristics. For 
this reason, most physicalists deny that conscious experiences are strictly identical to physical 
events. Most favor the more moderate physicalist thesis that conscious experiences are 
necessitated by, but not identical to, physical events. 
Moderate physicalism also faces the exclusion problem (Kim 1989b). If physical effects 
can be causally explained purely by reference to physical causes, and physical causes are not 
identical to conscious experiences, then physical explanations exclude explanations invoking 
conscious states. (See Bennett 2007 for an illuminating discussion of this problem and of the 
responses available to the moderate physicalist.)  
4.2  The completeness premise 
I believe that epiphenomenalism, the denial of premise 1 of the argument, is less 
damaging to our commonsense views than it initially appears (Gertler forthcoming). But my 
discussion here will center on premise 2, which is known as the completeness premise. It says that 
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the realm of the physical is explanatorily complete, in that we never need to invoke anything 
outside that realm to explain any (explainable) physical event.  
Applying our conception of the physical yields the following interpretation of the 
completeness premise.  
 Structural-Dynamic Completeness:  
For every effect that can be exhaustively characterized in structural-
dynamic terms, an explanation invoking only structural-dynamic 
phenomena is (in principle) available.13  
This statement seems plainly true. By conceptualizing an effect in structural-dynamic 
terms, we more or less ensure that it is amenable to structural-dynamic explanation. After all, 
structural-dynamic characterizations of a phenomenon include its causal and nomic properties: 
the kinds of interactions it enters into, and the laws governing its behavior. So to characterize an 
event in structural-dynamic terms is already to locate it within the explanatory framework of 
structure and dynamics. What this shows is that much of the weight of the argument from 
mental causation is borne by the way that the effects to be explained—the “physical” effects—
are conceptualized. 
In order for the exclusion argument to succeed, our way of conceptualizing the events to 
be explained—the “physical effects”—must be not only accurate but also exhaustive. The 
argument would fail if there were features of these target effects that were not simply a matter of 
structure and dynamics. For suppose that the physical effect to be explained had some such 
features. (These could be characteristics at the fundamental level of physics, which underlie or 
complement the phenomenon’s structure and dynamics.) In that case, the availability of a 
structural-dynamic explanation would not render other explanations superfluous. These other 
explanations might do needed explanatory work as regards the aspect of the phenomenon that 
resists structural-dynamic analysis. This would neutralize the overdetermination worry, and 
thereby undermine the exclusion argument.14 
These reflections reveal an assumption of the exclusion argument: that our way of 
conceptualizing the physical, in terms of structure and dynamics, is not only accurate but also 
exhaustive, in that it captures all explanatorily salient features of physical reality. This assumption 
seems reasonable enough, so long as we have no reason to think that there’s a dimension of 
physical phenomena that resists structural-dynamic analysis or explanation. But it’s worth noting 
that this is a very substantial assumption. It requires an especially ambitious view about the 
relation between how we conceptualize reality and reality itself. The previous section discussed a 
moderate (but still questionable) claim about this relation, namely that if two theories—two 
ways of conceptualizing and explaining a set of phenomena—accommodate the data equally 
well, then the simpler theory is more likely to be true. If we had reason to accept that claim, it 
could be used to establish that the way our physical theories conceptualize (physical) reality, in 
terms of structure and dynamics, is accurate: that is, physical reality truly has the structural-
dynamic features we attribute to it. But even this argument, which relies on a questionable claim 
about the link between simplicity and truth, is silent on the question whether structure and 
dynamics exhaust the physical. For it says nothing about whether there is anything beyond 
structure and dynamics.  
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The assumption that there is no aspect of physical phenomena that evades structural-
dynamic explanation could be challenged on a variety of grounds. In fact, the worry about causal 
exclusion could fuel just such a challenge. Positing an aspect of physical effects that is not 
amenable to structural-dynamic explanations provides a way to avoid both epiphenomenalism 
and overdetermination. 
Let me sum up. The leading form of the problem of mental causation, the exclusion 
argument, depends on an ambitious assumption: that our conceptualization of physical 
phenomena, in terms of structure and dynamics, is not only accurate but also exhaustive. This 
assumption goes well beyond the kind of background assumption required to avoid skepticism, 
viz. that our concepts correspond (at least roughly) to features of reality itself. It also goes well 
beyond the idea that simpler theories are more likely to be true. And it is a conceptual, 
philosophical claim, not a scientific one: nothing empirical could establish that physical theory 
comprehensively captures the underlying reality it (perhaps accurately) describes. So this objection 
to dualism, like the objection from simplicity, relies on confidence that our way of 
conceptualizing the physical, in physical theories, is linked to the physical itself. But the required 
link here is particularly robust. It is that there is no aspect of physical phenomena beyond what 
is captured by our theories; in other words, physical phenomena consist entirely in structure and 
dynamics (and what is necessitated by structure and dynamics). 
5. The Epistemic Sources of Dualism and Physicalism 
Arguments on both sides of this debate rely on epistemic premises: claims about how we 
represent, conceptualize, and learn about conscious experience and/or physical phenomena. 
These arguments also rely on strategies for justifying the inference from their respective 
epistemic premises to their respective metaphysical conclusions. 
For the dualist, the epistemic premises include the subjectivity of consciousness and the 
(apparent) conceivability of zombies. The metaphysical conclusion is that conscious experience 
is not identical to or necessitated by structural-dynamic phenomena. The bridge from the 
epistemic to the metaphysical is the “no brute necessities” assumption: if there were necessary 
connections between conscious experience and structural-dynamic phenomena, these 
connections would be intelligible to us. 
 For the physicalist, the epistemic premises include the claim that conceptualizing 
physical phenomena in terms of structure and dynamics—the conceptualization embodied in 
physical theory—is not only accurate but exhaustive. The metaphysical conclusion is that 
conscious experience is amenable to explanation in these terms: it consists in, or is necessitated 
by, structural-dynamic phenomena. In the arguments we considered here, the bridge from the 
epistemic to the metaphysical depends on simplicity considerations. Suppose that all concrete 
phenomena other than consciousness consist in, or are necessitated by, purely structural-
dynamic phenomena (this is the epistemic premise). In that case, a structural-dynamic 
explanation of consciousness will yield a theory of concrete reality that has a relatively high 
degree of theoretical simplicity. In particular, given the epistemic premise, a structural-dynamic 
explanation of consciousness will yield a theory that is simpler than a theory that disavows 
structural-dynamic explanations of consciousness—that is, a dualist theory. The bridge from the 
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epistemic premise to the metaphysical conclusion is the assumption that if two theories 
accommodate the data equally well, the simpler theory is more likely to be true.  
The exclusion argument fits this pattern. The epistemic premise is that structural-
dynamic explanations of non-mental phenomena are accurate and comprehensive—they leave 
no dimension of the target phenomenon unexplained. In light of that premise, positing 
alternative explanations—explanations citing phenomena that are not structural-dynamical—
compromises theoretical simplicity, by requiring overdetermination. Embracing 
epiphenomenalism also threatens simplicity. For the causal inefficacy of conscious experience 
makes it a “nomological dangler”: something that (we presume) arises from physical processes 
but does not give rise to anything. This picture is plainly inelegant. The threat to simplicity 
seems to be what Smart has in mind when he complains that “the laws whereby these 
nomological danglers would dangle … would be like nothing so far known in science. They have 
a queer ‘smell’ to them.” (Smart 1959: 142-3) 
One’s position on dualism will not be determined simply by how one regards conceptual 
arguments, or by the extent of one’s deference to physical science and theorizing. Arguments on 
both sides of this debate presume that the way we conceptualize a phenomenon can justify 
claims about that phenomenon’s metaphysical nature. And arguments on both sides employ 
distinctively philosophical claims—claims outside the purview of science—about the status and 
proper domain of physical science. Where one stands on the question of dualism chiefly 
depends on where one stands on more specific epistemic questions: the epistemic premises of 
the arguments for and against dualism, and the way these arguments justify the inference from 
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1 The fact that “physical” occurs in both conceptions does not challenge their legitimacy, since they 
are not intended as reductive analyses.  
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2 This is a rough characterization, adapted from Goldman’s very useful discussion of the alleged 
“publicity requirement” in science (Goldman 1997). Goldman considers various ways of refining 
this characterization. 
3 The possibility that a single experience might be introspected by multiple persons is raised by some 
cases of craniopagus twins—twins who are fused at the cranium. A pair of craniopagus twins born 
in 2006, Krista and Tatiana Hogan, are said to share some sensations. When one twin is tickled both 
feel the tickle (Dominus 2011). Whether this challenges the claim that an experience can be 
introspected only by a single subject depends on further details: specifically, whether both twins 
have introspective access to a single conscious experience, or whether instead the tickling causes 
each to have her own tickle experience.  
4 Physicalists who use the so-called “phenomenal concept strategy” to block arguments for dualism 
generally claim that there are ways of conceptualizing the qualitative character of experiences that are 
available only to those who have had such experiences. But in most versions of this strategy, these 
conceptualizations—so-called “phenomenal concepts”—are not required for a comprehensive 
understanding of the qualitative property itself (e.g. Levin 2006). Some physicalists, such as Balog 
(2012) and Howell (2013), allow that introspection is required for fully comprehending the 
qualitative character of conscious experience, but argue that this epistemic fact is compatible with a 
physicalist view about the nature of consciousness. Chalmers (2006) challenges this general 
physicalist strategy. I raise doubts about Balog’s and Howell’s versions of it in a forthcoming paper 
(Gertler forthcoming). 
5 The difficulty of the former strategy is reflected in the intuitive appeal of the Jaynes passage above, 
and in the force of the Knowledge Argument for dualism (section 2.1). Difficulties facing the latter 
strategy include those faced by the second phenomenal concept strategy (see note 4). 
6 Crucially, we are not to assume that the duplicate is subject to the same laws of nature. For as the 
séance example illustrated (section 1.3), dualism is compatible with the idea that consciousness arises 
from physical phenomena as a matter of contingent laws.  
7 Another concern is that we may err even in applying those concepts we do possess: that is, in 
attempting to conceive of a zombie. Chalmers addresses this issue by appealing to an idealized 
notion of conceivability. As he notes, this notion idealizes away from our cognitive limitations in 
much the same way as the notion of a priori truths idealizes away from those limitations: a 
mathematical equation may be a priori even if, because of its complexity, it cannot be properly 
evaluated by unaided human cognition.  
8 Since dualism is a thesis about what is possible, rather than a thesis about what is necessary or 
impossible, this debate could ostensibly be resolved by empirical observation: e.g., the discovery of 
two creatures that were exactly similar, physically, but that differed in their conscious experiences. 
But verifying this would be difficult (to say the least). And it would undermine the standard 
naturalist form of dualism, which says that there is a lawlike relation between consciousness and the 
physical. 
9 That a theory is compatible with physicalism does not entail that it is simpler than a dualist theory. 
Suppose that qualitative features of experience are intrinsic to structural-dynamic entities, but are not 
themselves fixed by structural-dynamic factors. This entails dualism (on my formulation of dualism). 
Yet it is compatible with a high degree of both parsimony and elegance: e.g., a kind of monism that 
allows for a sparse set of basic laws and principles. Views of this kind, often inspired by Russell 
(1927), have recently grown in prominence. (See chapters 14 and 22 of this volume, and the papers 
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in Alter and Nagasawa 2015.) There is some controversy as to whether this monistic view strictly 
qualifies as dualism or as physicalism; such controversies mean that any formulation of these 
positions, including mine, will be open to question. But the fact that this view seems, to many, to be 
closer in spirit to dualism than to physicalism illustrates the inadequacy of the term “dualism”, as 
that term suggests that dualism is incompatible with monism. 
10 Sober expresses skepticism about the association of parsimony with truth, as regards “the mind/body 
identity theory”, a version of physicalism. (The term “model selection theory” refers to a particular 
operational interpretation of parsimony.) 
Placing the mind/body identity theory and dualism within the context of model selection 
theory requires one to think of the contending theories in terms of their predictive accuracy, 
not their truth. Metaphysicians may balk at this, proclaiming that they don’t care about 
predictive accuracy and want only to figure out what is true. I am not arguing against that 
preference. Rather, my point is that the parsimony argument for the identity theory finds a 
natural home in the model selection framework. If there is another treatment of the 
argument that establishes its connection with truth, I do not know what that treatment is. 
(Sober 2009, 137) 
11 On the plausible view that a conscious experience is the instantiation of qualitative properties in a 
subject at a time, the claim that conscious experiences are physical events implies that qualitative 
properties are physical. 
12 This formulation is paraphrased from Papineau 2002: ch. 1. 
13 Strictly speaking, on our formulation physical events are constituted or necessitated by structural-
dynamic phenomena. I elided this qualification for brevity. It does not change the basic point since, 
trivially, an effect necessitated by structural-dynamic phenomena is explainable in terms of structure 
and dynamics. 
14 Following Russell (1927), some have suggested that structural-dynamic characterizations neglect 
the intrinsic or categorical features of physical things. This opens up the possibility of a variety of 
alternatives to classic dualism and physicalism. See note 9. 
